This paper presents a model of waste product trade between a developed and a developing country. North firms produce products that are consumed exclusively in
Introduction
The waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) directed by the European Union (EU) requires that a producer recycles its own products in EU regions. Japan's WEEE recycling system also requires products to be recycled within the country.
However, recycling is incomplete within the consuming country. Post-consumer products are legally or illegally exported from developed to developing countries. For example, Fuse et al. (2011) estimate that more than 50% of indium and 20-30% of barium, lead, antimony, strontium, zirconium, silver, gold, and tin in domestically discarded products are not recycled in Japan, but instead are exported to other Asian countries. Kellenberg (2012) empirically shows the international waste haven effects that include the export of physical waste by-products, rather than goods production, to low environmental regulation countries.
There have been many studies on recycling within a country. Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995) propose a deposit-refund system with a tax on output and with a rebate on proper disposal. Palmer and Walls (1997) present a formal theoretical model on production-recycling. It is a pioneering study on waste and recycling, but is limited to domestic recycling. Walls and Palmer (2001) extend the previous model in order to formulate the so-called integrated product policy by treating three externalities: waste by-product, emission, and waste. The central issue in waste research is that the first best policy is prevented by illegal disposal and dumping. Therefore, waste-recycling policies to achieve the second best have been explored by many authors. Shinkuma (2003) shows that the second best policy among the three policies (unit pricing with an advance disposal fee, a deposit-refund system, and a producer take-back requirement system) depends on the price of the recycled good and the marginal transaction cost. Koide (2008) investigates optimal sets of take-back fees for collecting and recycling, and fines for illegal dumping in order to analyze the situation under Japan's Home Appliance Recycling Law. Honma and Chang (2010) examine recycling with and without cooperation of oligopoly firms. They show that virgin material taxes or final disposal taxes discourage firms from engaging in recycling R&D efforts in normal situations, regardless of R&D cooperation. Ino (2011) allows for the possibility of firms' illegal disposal and advocates a second-best deposit-refund system.
Although recycling activities reach beyond national borders, there are fewer studies on international recycling than on the domestic recycling referenced above. Copeland (1991) shows that trade restrictions on waste disposal enhance welfare when firms illegally dispose waste. Cassing and Kuhn (2003) formulate a model for international trade in hazardous waste where waste-importing and waste-exporting countries cooperate strategically. Higashida and Jinji (2006) study the strategic use of recycled content standard in an international duopoly. Kinnaman and Yokoo (2011) investigate a tax-subsidy system on durable goods, which are consumed as new goods in a developed country and as second-hand goods in a developing country. Shinkuma and Managi (2011, Chapter 8) analyze international trade in second-hand goods and scraps between developed and developing countries. They state that an extended product responsibility (EPR) policy in a developed country is nationally but not globally optimal.
Despite several papers' analyses of international-reuse trade, international recycling that has been actually performed has not been analyzed theoretically. This paper presents a North-South recycling trade model. In this model, there are two countries-developed North and developing South. North firms produce products exclusively for North consumption. After consumption, parts of them are exported from North to South. This export may be done illegally. The remaining portion of the waste products are collected and recycled by firms in North. South firms engage exclusively in recycling. However, the South government cannot find illegal dumping of residuals after recycling because of an inadequate governance capacity. Therefore, we assume that South subsidizes recycled material.
The model addresses five scenarios: closed economy, the first best, strategic government, selfish North government and inactive South government, and benevolent North government and inactive South government.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model. Section 3 presents optimal policies under five different scenarios. Section 4 compares tax-subsidy rates among the five outcomes. Section 5 concludes. There are two countries, North and South. Due to differences in technology, the end product is produced exclusively in North using two production factors (labor and capital); however, waste product is recycled in both countries. An outline of our model is shown in Figure 1 .
Production and recycling in North
In North, there are n identical perfectly-competitive firms. A representative firm in North produces units of a final consumer good, x , by using labor, N L , and capital,
be the production function. We assume that the production function is strictly concave, that is,
, and that the cross derivatives are North South 
The first-order conditions of the profit maximization are as follows 4 :
Recycling in South
In South, m identical firms engage exclusively in recycling because we assume that production technology in unavailable in South and because recycling is labor intensive.
A representative South firm purchases a waste product, Because of inadequate administrative capacities of the South government, it cannot impose a fine for illegal dumping of the residuals or a tax on final disposal of waste.
South firms can dispose the residual without a cost or fine. We assume that the South government can introduce only two policy instruments in order to alleviate environmental damage by final disposal of waste and illegal dumping after recycling.  . An South firm's profit is written as follows:
The first-order conditions are
In (6) and (7), the marginal revenue of each input equals the marginal cost including the tariff and subsidy.
1.3 Welfare Let ) (Q P be the demand function of the product in North, where
We assume that 0 ) (   Q P . North welfare is defined as
is the environmental cost associated with residuals in North . South welfare is defined as is extraordinary large, the closed North economy is the first best. If so, the first best policy set includes a Pigovian tax in North and a ban of the waste-product trade. This is an uninteresting case because the international waste-trade problem has vanished. Therefore, we presume that the closed North economy cannot be the first best.
The first best case
In the first best case, we consider a policy that maximizes the joint welfare,
. To avoid illegal dumping in South, we assume a positive value of
Therefore, the joint welfare to be maximized is
Maximizing with respect to
yields the following first-order conditions:
where E P satisfies the market-clearing price for the product market in North.
Equations (11) to (15) state that the marginal social benefit should equal the marginal social cost. For example, the value of marginal product of labor equals the sum of wages, marginal collecting cost, and marginal environmental damage, minus the value of marginal recycled material. Combining the above welfare maximization with the profit-maximizing first-order conditions, we obtain the following tax-subsidy rates:
) (
where "**" denotes tax and subsidy rates on the first best case, and This cannot occur at the optimum level. 
Strategic case
In a strategic case, each country's government maximizes its own welfare and does not take into account a spillover effect to the foreign country. The first-order conditions of welfare maximization in North are
)) 1 ( (
Combining the above welfare maximization with the profit-maximizing first-order conditions for North, we obtain the following strategic tax rate.
"*" denotes tax and subsidy rates in the strategic case. The first-order conditions of welfare maximization in South are
Combining the above welfare maximization with the profit-maximizing first-order conditions for South, we obtain the following strategic subsidy and tariff rates: Proof Applying Cramer's rule to (6) and (7), we obtain Again applying Cramer's rule to (6) and (7), we obtain 
We state the following proposition.
Proposition 2 An increase in the wage rate of South decreases labor and waste product demand, and then improves South environment in both strategic and first best cases.
Selfish policy in North and no policy in South
We assume that the South government does not implement an environmental or trade policy due to its administrative limitations-a valid assumption for least developing countries. Therefore, only the North government implements policies. In this and the 
Due to the lack of subsidy, the South environment deteriorates due to the illegal dumping of residuals.
Benevolent policy in North and no policy in South
This subsection considers the North government as benevolent and the South government remains with no policy. Due to the absence of a policy in South, the value of marginal recycling of labor should equal the South wage rate. Then the North government should solve the following constrained maximization problem,
where  is a Lagrange multiplier. The first-order conditions on
are the same as the non-constrained case. The rest of the first-order conditions on South follows: 
The sign of  is negative. We state the following proposition. We assume that ) (
is sufficiently large in the range considered; therefore, the sign of
which is obtained after some manipulation of (34) 
3. Discussion Table 1 summarizes the tax-subsidy system for the five scenarios. Only the first best outcome needs a negative tariff for the import of waste products to South. In the strategic government case, one problem is that the South government must finance the subsidy. In the selfish North government case, North benefits by avoiding collection and recycling costs by outflow of waste into South. The South environment, however, would enormously deteriorate due to the absence of a policy. Considering the responsibility of developed countries, when South implements no policy, the North government should adopt the benevolent policy that contains the export tax to curb the inflow of waste products to South.
Basel Convention up to here. However, when the export tax on waste product is considered, we assume that trade on waste product is legal. 
Conclusions
This paper presents a model of waste product trade between a developed and a developing country. We find that the negative import tariff is required to adjust the difference of marginal social costs between the two countries in the first best case. If the North government is selfish, North benefits by avoiding collection and recycling costs by outflow of waste into South. In this case, if possible, the South government should subsidize the residual after recycling to prevent the illegal dumping. If the North government is benevolent and the South has no policy, the North government should impose an export tax on waste products to South to curb environmental damage resulting from the illegal dumping in South together with the domestic Pigovian tax.
In our model, the North government and firms cannot observe whether the waste products exported are properly disposed of in South. If a traceability system of waste flow is available in both countries, improper recycling in South can be controlled with more effective policy instruments.
